President Biden to Nominate Former CFTC Chair Gary Gensler to Lead the SEC
In a client alert issued by Olshan's Shareholder Activism Group last week, we reported that certain factions within the Delaware State Bar Association were attempting to fast track an amendment to Section 110 of the Delaware General Corporation Law that would allow Delaware corporations to postpone their annual meetings of stockholders in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. We expressed serious concerns that the proposed amendment could be abused by corporations looking to postpone their annual meetings and disenfranchise stockholders under the pretense that such a delay is required due to COVID-19. Shortly after the release of our client alert, Governor John Carney issued on April 6 the tenth modification to his State of Emergency Declaration relating to COVID-19 intended to reduce the number of in-person stockholder meetings held by Delaware corporations in order to protect the health and safety of the civilian population in light of the pandemic. As discussed in this client alert, we believe the Governor's order is sufficient to allow corporations to address COVID-19 related logistical challenges they may be facing with respect to their meetings and there is no need for state legislators to rush to adopt a statutory amendment that could threaten stockholder rights.
On February 3, 2020, Olshan’s Shareholder Activism Group issued a letter of comment to the Securities and Exchange Commission in response to its proposed amendments to the federal proxy rules released on November 5, 2019 that would condition the availability of certain existing exemptions from the information and filing requirements of the proxy rules for proxy voting advice businesses upon compliance with additional disclosure and procedural requirements. The scope of our comments is limited to the severe shortcomings of the proposed rules in terms of their practical application in the “real world” of a proxy contest. We have drawn upon our vast experience in advising on hundreds of contested solicitations to highlight the flaws inherent to the proposed rules.
On June 27, 2019, the Delaware Chancery Court entered an injunction requiring the boards of trustees of two closed-end investment funds (the “Funds”) to count the votes in favor of director candidates nominated by shareholder Saba Capital at the annual meetings scheduled for July 8, 2019. Saba Capital had timely given notice of its nominations in compliance with the Funds’ advance notification bylaws. In a response weeks later, the Funds asked that the nominees complete a supplemental questionnaire, which had “nearly one hundred questions over forty-seven pages, and was due in five business days.” The Funds declared the nominations invalid after Saba Capital missed the five-day deadline for submitting the questionnaires. In the case captioned Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. BlackRock Credit Allocation Income Trust, et al., Vice Chancellor Zurn granted Saba Capital’s request for injunctive relief, finding that the Funds’ rejection of the nominations submitted by Saba Capital violated the Funds’ bylaws. As discussed in this Client Alert, the Court’s ruling is consistent with views recently expressed by Olshan that overzealous defense advisors continue to “cross the line” by using onerous, overbroad questionnaires as traps to thwart shareholder nominations and chill activist campaigns.
On November 16, 2017, Institutional Shareholder Services released updates for its Global Benchmark Proxy Voting Guidelines that will take effect for shareholders meetings held on or after February 1, 2018.
Institutional Shareholder Services ("ISS") recently released updates for its Global Benchmark Proxy Voting Guidelines that take into account the results of ISS’ Global Policy Survey, which we covered in our previous blog post on September 26, 2017, as well as its examination of relevant research, studies and commentary and various policy roundtables and group discussions held by ISS. This post focuses on ISS’ main updates to its policies for the United States relating to its recommendations on director elections and shareholder proposals.
Texas’ proposed “Bring Business to Texas and Fairness in Disclosure Act” would require certain investors and proxy advisory firms to comply with new disclosure requirements when dealing with publicly traded Texas-based companies.
On October 26, 2016, the Commissioners of the Securities and Exchange Commission voted 2-1 to propose to require universal proxy ballots in contested elections. Proponents of universal proxies believe that the current federal proxy regime makes it too difficult for shareholders to mix and match their votes among all candidates, thereby disenfranchising shareholders and undermining corporate governance in the United States. Universal proxies would include all management and dissident nominees on one proxy card from which shareholders would vote. Under the current rules and proxy voting mechanics, a shareholder who desires to split votes generally must attend the shareholders meeting and vote by ballot.
This blog post discusses the recent In re Vaalco case where the Delaware Chancery Court confirmed that, subject to certain enumerated exceptions, Section 141(k) of the Delaware General Corporation Law provides stockholders with the right to remove directors with or without cause despite contradictory language in a corporation's charter. The ruling may directly impact several companies with similar language in their governing documents and provides further clarity on this important issue for stockholders who may wish to effect change between annual meetings.
This blog post discusses recent SEC guidance that will adversely impact the ability of reporting companies to exclude shareholder proposals from their proxy materials. The bulletin issued by the SEC significantly narrows the "conflicting proposals" exclusion under
Rule 14a-8(i)(9) and confirms the SEC's historical interpretation of the "ordinary business" exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(7).